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Abstract
This study dates business cycles in 10 European countries, the
United States, and Japan between 1925 and 1936. The aim is to
establish a consistent dating of the world economic crisis, which is a
precondition for understanding the sharp economic decline in many
countries during the interwar period.
Three approaches were applied that are common in business cycle
dating. First, a deskriptive analysis infers on recessions based on
the two-consecutive quarters approach often associated with the US
National Bureau of Economic Research. Second, the time series is
decomposed into trend and cycle using the Hodrick-Prescott (1980)
ﬁlter. The third approach is to use Markov-regime switching models,
which was proposed by Hamilton (1989) for such purposes.
The results of conﬁrm that the Great Depression was a global
phenomenon, not limited to the US or Germany. Business cycle co-
movement in the interwar period is at a level comparable to the post-
WWII period. This ﬁnding points at the contribution of international
business cycle integration to the course of the decline in single coun-
tries.
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11 The relevance of comparative dating of the
world economic crisis
The world economic crisis1 has been subject to comprehensive investigation
in the ﬁeld of economic history. Business cycle research is another ﬁeld,
for which the Great Depression is a focal point. At the intersection of the
two literatures a comparative, cross-country business cycle dating is missing,
despite its implications for explanatory approaches. The rationale of many
hypothesis of the Great Depression relies in one way or another on the course
of the business cycle at the national and international level.
Of course, there does exist a number of studies on the Great Depression,
in which the time series evidence for certain countries is being investigated.2
However, the dating of interwar cycles provided by these studies is of lim-
ited value for cross-country analysis, since it concerns individual countries.
The dating reﬂects national experiences during this period or it is guided
by interest in the economic history of one speciﬁc country. Analyzing the
Depression in an international perspective makes it necessary then to incor-
porate datings, which result from diﬀerent approaches. Datings have been
based on diﬀerent data frequencies, too, namely on quarterly or even annual
data. Both factors certainly provide pitfalls.
This study proposes a comparative business cycle dating by consistently
analyzing macroeconomic ﬂuctuations in the US, Europe, and Japan be-
tween 1925 and 1936. It investigates the respective Depression(s) applying
techniques typical of business cycle research. Another goal is to produce sev-
eral stylized facts that a general theory on the Depression should be able to
explain, mainly the chronology of turning points in diﬀerent countries and
diﬀerences across countries in the degree of severity of the downturn. The
data used in the analysis is available at monthly frequency for the interwar
period.
In economic history most hypotheses on causes and origins of the crisis
have been derived from analysis of the depression in the United States (US),
e.g. Friedman and Schwartz (1967) held responsible only the Federal Re-
serve’s restrictive monetary policy in 1928 and 1929. But the early literature
was not able to convincingly explain the downturn. For some time now, the
focus of research is thus shifting towards international developments during
the interwar period. Eichengreen (1992) and Bernanke (1995) stressed the
importance of the gold standard, i.e. the international monetary framework
1I am using the terms Great Depression and world economic crisis as synonyms.
2Cf. Temin (1998) and Eichengreen (2004) for an overview.
2between 1925 and 1931, as a transmission mechanism of adverse monetary
shocks. Others have doubted that the depression originated in the US and
locate the cause of the decline in the economic periphery instead, e.g. Ritschl
(2002) and, quite early, Kindleberger (1973/86).
Similarly, the focus of business cycle research has been almost exclusively
on the Great Depression in the US (beginning with Fisher 1933).3 Recently
the strand of the literature concerned with international co-movement of
cycles has begun to take into account the development of the crisis in other
countries, too (e.g. Bergman, Bordo, and Jonung 1998, Bordo and Helbling
2003). However, since the interest of business cycle research is to explain
business cycles in general, some authors have raised the question, whether
“the Great Depression should be treated as a singular, anomalous event or
a litmus test for any general theory of business cycles.” (Basu and Taylor
1999, p.5) After all, business cycle research views the Depression as just one
downturn among many others.
The limited interest of the business cycle literature on the other hand
implies that economic history can contribute to the issue by dealing ap-
propriately with the special nature of the Great Depression. Despite the
broadening of the country focus, neither of the two literatures has proposed
a consistent dating of the world economic crisis.
A straightforward business cycle dating of the global economic crisis is a
prerequisite for discussing the global causes, conditions, and impact of the
Great Depression. Hypotheses that build on the eﬀect of international depen-
dencies require thus a comparative description and dating of the recession.
It is a building block, at which point in time which country experienced the
peak and trough in industrial production. The dating of turning points can
help to verify or falsify hypotheses on the crisis within single countries and
at the global level. In order to propose a comparative dating, this study ap-
plies three approaches, which are widely-used business cycle analysis: (i) the
dating procedure associated with the NBER, (ii) conventional trend-cycle de-
composition using the Hodrick–Prescott (HP) ﬁlter, and (iii) Markov-regime
switching models as proposed by Hamilton (1989).
The study adds to the economic history literature by regarding the Great
Depression mainly as a business cycle event at an international scale. Its
focus is comparably narrow: Less than answering open questions, it proposes
a dating in order to provoke further research in this direction. In addition
to dating and describing macroeconomic cycles during the interwar period, I
3Temin (1998) provides an overview of the US centric literature.
3shall check very roughly which of the ﬁndings support and contradict certain
hypothesis, particularly Eichengreen (1992).
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section contains a review of
the role of business cycle ﬂuctuations in hypothesis on the world economic
crisis. Section 3 provides results country-by-country from three approaches
that are common in business cycle research. The individual results are used
in section 4 for making inferences on the course of the global crisis. Section
5 concludes.
42 The Great Depression as a business cycle
episode
Modern business cycle research has established the conception of non-deterministic
cycles that are caused by a continuous ﬂow of stochastic shocks. The eco-
nomic system turns these shocks into ﬂuctuations, i.e. it functions as impuls-
propagation mechanism. Features of the resulting quasi-cycles are variable
frequencies and amplitudes.
Central to business cycle theory is the interest in what kind of shocks
prevails in producing ﬂuctuations and how ﬂuctuations are diﬀused through
the economy. Within the aggregate supply - aggregate demand (AS–AD)
framework cycles result from domestic shocks in demand or supply. These can
be either real shocks or monetary shocks. In their Monetary History of the
United States Friedman and Schwartz (1963) explain the Great Depression
in the US by an exogenous monetary shock that aﬀected the real economy.
It is also possible that ﬂuctuations stem from the transmission of for-
eign shocks, i.e. they are due to innovations in other countries. The fact
that many economies turned down during the 1920s and 1930s has raised
the question, which countries experienced a depression caused primarily by
domestic factors and which countries were aﬀected primarily through the
downturn of other economies. In those case, in which the recession was
due to domestic innovations, the kind of innovations is of central interest.4
Following the hypothesis of Friedman and Schwartz the rest of the world
was aﬀected by the downturn in the US, which was induced by the Federal
Reserve’s restrictive monetary policy in 1927 and 1928.
After all, identiﬁcation is the central issue, i.e. which shocks are crucial
and how they are propagated. In order to disentangle cause and eﬀect,
the dating of business cycle turning points has always played an important
role, particularly in order to criticize the consistency of an explanation. The
monetarist hypothesis of Friedman and Schwartz was weakened among other
things, because it proved diﬃcult to identify a monetary shock in the US
large enough to explain the harsh downturn abroad. Particularly so, since
IP in some countries declined several month before the US economy began
to turn down (Eichengreen 2004).
Figure 1 depicts the course of industrial production and mining (IPM) in
the US, Japan, and Germany as well as two composite series of IPM in West-
4See Temin (1998) for an account of the diﬀerent shocks to the US economy during the
20th century.
5ern and Eastern European countries.5 For manipulations of the series as to
achieve comparability cf. section 6.1. The extraordinary development of the
series illustrates the magnitude of the Great Depression. It is important to
note that ﬁgure 1 displays monthly observations of an index of physical IPM
and not, as it may seem, business cycle components in the sense of deviations
from some growth trend.6 The graph shows that apparently the whole indus-
trialized world was aﬀected by the crisis with the largest decline in IPM to
be found in Germany, the US, and Central Eastern Europe. IPM in Western
Europe began to decline at about the same time as in the former countries,
but at a lower pace, whereas Japan somehow managed to escape the crisis
in mid-1931, although ”the slide into the abyss (Kindleberger 1973/86) of its
economy had begun in 1930 as well.
Eichengreen (1992) replaced the theory of Friedman and Schwartz by the
hypothesis that the Great Depression was merely indirectly triggered by the
monetary policy of the Federal Reserve in 1928 and 1929. According to him
the background against which the Great Depression took place is crucial. His
argument rests on two pillars: ﬁrst, the fact that the policy of central banks
around the world was tied to that of the Federal Reserve by the interwar
gold standard. The rules of the gold standard forced several countries, e.g.
Germany, to pursue a monetary policy in response to the shocks that was in-
appropriate for the economic situation as these countries were already on the
edge of recession (Eichengreen 2004). Second, the economic decline abroad -
already since 1929 - prevented the US economy from exporting more abroad
in order to make up for the decline in domestic demand.
In his seminal Golden Fetters, Eichengreen concentrates on the ﬁrst of
these arguments, i.e. that the institutional set-up of the gold standard
worked as a mechanism to propagate ﬂuctuations resulting from monetary
policy shocks to the international economy and aggrevating them. Therefore,
Eichengreen (1992) stresses the importance of untying the Golden Fetters,
i.e. to dissolve the gold standard, in order to resolve the crisis. Against this
background it is interesting to note that ﬁgure 1 indicates that the decline
in Germany and the US came to a halt already in early 1931 for about half
a year, i.e. several month before the dissolution of the gold standard.
5Eastern Europe: Austria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland; Western (and North-
ern) Europe: Belgium, Britain, France, Sweden, and Finland. Unweighted averages.
6The data were seasonally adjusted using X11–ARIMA from the pastecs package in R.
In order to check robustness of the adjustment, I applied seasonal dummy variables as
well, but without notable change. Still, I consider X–11 to be more appropriate than the
dummy variable approach, since I ﬁnd it diﬃcult to assume that seasonal eﬀects remained



































































Figure 1: Industrial production in Europe, the US, and Japan, 1925–1936
Eichengreen (1992, 2004) has underlined the importance of comparative
accounts of the interwar period. His explanation explicitly stresses the im-
portance of international economic relations arguing that conditions within
and between many countries were fragile in this period. Implicitly, it also
relies on timing of macroeconomic cycles in the rest of the world (ROW),
most notably in Europe. Yet, ﬁgure 1 provides neither visual evidence of a
signiﬁcant positive response of IPM to monetary policy shocks in the US in
1928 nor of an immediate eﬀect in most countries of the dissolution of the
gold standard in 1931.
73 Time series analysis
The data set comprises monthly indices of industrial production and mining
(IPM) from 10 European countries, the US, and Japan. The data was chosen
as a proxy of aggregate economic activity, because it is recorded at a high
frequency, internationally comparable7, and there does not exist any other
broad indicator of economic activity, such as GDP, for the interwar period.
The ﬁrst dating exercise is a business cycle analysis, which uses the deﬁni-
tion often associated with the classical dating procedure of the US National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). It is subsequently denoted as pseudo
NBER dating. The main part in section 3.3 relies on the Markov-regime
switching model suggested by Hamilton (1989) for similar purpose. These
approaches are complemented by trend-cycle decomposition in section 3.2,
an approach that is widely applied in business cycle research, too. The latter
serves mainly to cross check results.
The question is, whether there are systematic similarities and diﬀerences
in the development of IPM between countries. A sensible hypothesis should
then both be able to explain the general development across countries dur-
ing the interwar period and say something on systematic diﬀerences between
countries in the course of the crisis. Linking such similarities and diﬀer-
ences to patterns of institutional or policy similarities and diﬀerences would
certainly strengthen a hypothesis.
3.1 Deskriptive business cycle analysis
The starting point of the analysis, the above ﬁgure 1, shows several aspects
worth noting. First, it appears diﬃcult to restrict the Great Depression to the
period 1929-1933. IPM in Germany stagnated already in 1928, whereas the
recovery after the crisis was sluggish both in Western and Eastern Europe.
This observation raises the question how to sensibly date the Great Depres-
sion at all. Second, there appears to be a certain degree of co-movement in
the development of IPM across the selected regions though less for Japan.
The eyeballing suggests potential business cycle integration. Third, a pos-
itive reaction of IPM in those countries going oﬀ gold is not immediately
apparent from the plot.8 Fourth, the exceptional scope of the crisis is visible
from the time series. Usual recessions put a dent in IP, but do not cause a
severe downward shift in the long-run.
7Cf. Mattesini and Quintieri (1997), FN 5.
8Among the countries leaving the gold standard in 1931 are Austria, Britain, Czechoslo-
vakia, Finland, Germany, and Sweden (cf. Wolf and Yousef 2005).
8Table 1: Drop in IP between business cycle peak and trough
Country Peak date Peak level Trough date Trough level IP drop
Poland Apr 29 107.9 Mar 33 47.9 -56%
United States Jun 29 111.5 Mar 33 52.2 -53%
Germany Apr 29 105.3 Aug 32 50.7 -52%
Belgium Jun 29 104.0 Jul 32 50.2 -52%
Austria Jun 29 109.3 Dec 32 58.5 -46%
Czechoslovakia May 29 107.7 Mar 33 61.3 -43%
Hungary May 29 106.9 May 32 66.5 -38%
France Feb 30 113.3 Jul 32 72.7 -36%
Sweden Jan 30 107.6 Jul 32 70.2 -35%
Britain Aug 29 112.6 May 31 78.7 -30%
Finland Aug 29 102.4 Mar 32 74.6 -27%
Japan Nov 29 113.2 Dec 30 96.8 -15%
Notes: The ﬁgures are calculated on the basis of the seasonally adjusted data.
The base year of each index is 1928=100.
From the graph it is impossible to perform straightforward dating of turn-
ing points and of recessions. The popular strategy in deskriptive business cy-
cle analysis is, therefore, to follow a rule associated with the NBER. The rule
deﬁnes a recession as two consecutive quarters of decline in the absolute level
of industrial production.9 Following this rule, I identiﬁed recessions for each
country in my sample using quarterly averages over the monthly data. The
resulting recession episodes are depicted in appendix A (ﬁgures 12–23). An
even simpler approach in descriptive analysis is to compute turning points
as I have done from the monthly data in table 1.
Taken together, table 1 as well as ﬁgures 1 and 12–23 provide a simple
benchmark for more sophisticated approaches. The calculations given in
table 1 are consistent with the common claim that the US and Germany
experienced the largest drop in industrial production between 1929 and 1933.
But also in Poland and Belgium the drop in IPM from its pre-Depression peak
to the trough amounts to over 50%. If one enlarges this group by Austria and
Czechoslovakia, where IP still declined by more than 40%, and by Hungary,
the country next in the order, ﬁve out of the seven countries most severely
aﬀected are situated in Central (Eastern) Europe. These countries reach
their peak production between April and June 1929. All of the remaining
ﬁve countries reach their respective peak production level later than June
1929, namely between August 1929 and February 1930. The opposite is the
9The actual NBER dating procedure is more ﬂexible and relies on several aggregate
series.
9case for the lower turning points: The latter group experiences the trough
in IPM between December 1930 and July 1932. Except for Hungary (May
1932), all countries of the former group reach the lower turning point between
July 1932 and March 1933. It seems as if the extent of decline in a country’s
IPM coincided with its duration and the point in time it began.
From table 1 one learns yet little about how the Depression ﬁtted into
the general business cycle pattern. I used the pseudo-NBER procedure to
date recessions in the interwar period. The ﬁrst result of which is that every
country in the sample experienced a recession in the mid 1920s. For the US
and Germany the approach even implies two recessions during this period,
the ﬁrst one in 1925 and another one in late 1927.10 Regarding the Great
Depression, a more or less severe recession is identiﬁed for each country
at the turn of the decade as well. The analysis indicates that almost all
countries in the sample experienced a very long and double-dip recession.
Only Sweden, Finland, and Japan experience comparably short recessions
not showing the double-dip pattern. Although, the initial downturn took
place relatively contemporaneously, the following turning points varied a lot
over time by country. The approach yields that the Depression in the US
ended already in mid-1932 (cf. ﬁgure 12). This timing is in advance of the
through indicated by table 1 as well as the oﬃcial NBER dating, both of
which give the trough in March 1933.11
Figures 12–23 exhibit large diﬀerences in the development of IP between
countries.12 These diﬀerences are evident already during the pre-depression
boom. In the United Kingdom (UK) the recovery from a short, but huge,
slump following the miner’s strike in 1926 immediately turned into a boom
in late 1926.13 The German economy, in recession since spring 1925, picked
up at about the same time and experienced an intense, but short-lived boom.
The sharp increase in its IPM was probably fueled by the inﬂow of American
capital at that time (cf. Ritschl 2002, p.XXX). One reason, which could
have positively aﬀected Germany’s IPM is that Britain dropped out as an
exporter from the world market for coal during the miner’s strike. The US
10Except for the contraction in 1925, the results are broadly consistent with the reces-
sions acknowledged by the NBER’s Business Cycle Dating Committee on NBER’s website.
11Information taken from the NBER’s website: nber.org/cycles.html. The deviation is
likely caused by two short and very strong positive shocks, which bias the averaging over
quarters.
12However, a comparison of boxplots of all series remained too inconclusive to system-
atically depict diﬀerences.
13This is somewhat in contrast to stagnation mentioned by Kindleberger (1973/86) and
also by Ritschl (2002), which might be due to the diﬀerent frequencies, monthly vs. annual,
and series, IP vs. GDP, considered.
10economy enters short-lived upswing comparably late and only after a period
of stagnation. In contrast, the French business cycle appears to lag the overall
cycle by about a year. The country experiences a prolonged decline from
summer 1933 until early 1935, thus at a time all other countries are growing
strongly. Explanations focussing on the gold standard have ascribed the
French decline to its membership in the Gold Bloc, i.e. a group of countries,
which continued to adhere to the rules of the gold standard (e.g. Eichengreen
1992). Since Poland and Belgium, two other Gold Bloc members, did not fare
as badly as France, the adverse performance might have also been connected
to political unrest, e.g. to the February riots in 1934. IPM in the US develops
exceptionally from the summer of 1932 to autumn 1933. At ﬁrst, the index
increases strongly, but thereafter shows another large drop. Since I did not
ﬁnd any reference to this event in the literature, it obviously did not attracted
much attention by researchers, presumably because it is averaged out when
analyzing lower frequency data.
In the midst of the Great Depression an economic upturn is apparent
from the graphs in many countries. Viewed in detail, there is an obvious
international co-movement in the this development although country-speciﬁc
diﬀerences remain. According to this dating approach, this temporary upturn
takes place in 1931 in all of the countries, except in France, Poland, and the
US. It separates what Eichengreen (2004) calls the ﬁrst and the second stage
of the Depression. An exceptional case is Japan, where the end of the ﬁrst
recessionary period marks the early end of the decline at all. It appears
diﬃcult to link this upturn to the dissolution of the gold standard, since e.g.
in Britain, IPM starts to increase several month in advance of the country’s
exit from the gold standard, which is the true for other countries as well.
Still, in Britain the second recession is comparably short.
The pseudo-NBER approach reveals the global dimension of the depres-
sion and indicates a certain co-movement of business-cycles. In nine out of
twelve countries, including the US, Germany, and Britain, IPM peaks before
September 1929. Accordingly, the stock market crash at Wall Street in late
October 1929, another usual suspect in the literature, appears rather the
result than the cause of the mess. Large diﬀerences between countries are
found in the severity of the downturn as well as in the development of IPM
after 1931. The deskriptive analysis is not suited to evaluate the length of the
downturn and its extent within a single approach. It is diﬃcult to infer on
the long-term development. As the pseudo-NBER approach is very sensitive
to temporary jumps in IPM it potentially underestimates the duration of the
recessions, too.
113.2 Trend-cycle decomposition using HP ﬁltering
A standard approach in analyzing the development of industrial production
and GDP is to separate the cyclical components in a series yt from its trend
component.14 The approach in this paper is to assume that yt is composed
of a secular trend xt, cyclical ﬂuctuations around this trend ct, additional
seasonal ﬂuctuations st, and random ﬂuctuations ǫt. Such a relationship can
be formalized as
(1) yt = xt + ct + st + ǫt
After the series has been seasonally adjusted, it is possible to isolate
growth trend by applying the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) ﬁlter to the series. This









[(xt+1 − xt) − (xt − xt−1)]
2
Equation (2) yields an estimate of the growth component ˆ xt. It appears
to be based on measurement without theory. Yet, the approach requires
assumptions, which are part of various business cycle theories. A strong
assumption is that of separability of the components. The functional form
of the trend, namely its smoothness, must be assumed as well.15 Against
the background of the Great Depression, it is an advantage that the HP
ﬁlter allows for non-linearity of the growth trend. It appears inappropriate
to assume a linear growth component during this period, which is often done
in studies on post-WWII growth.
Figure 2 depicts the resulting growth components for all countries. The
curve progression is highly unusual for HP ﬁltered growth components. Only
the estimated trend of Japanese IPM displays the features that we know
from the post WWII period. If interprets these results by the underlying
idea of decomposition, the Great Depressionis not merely a peculiar busi-
ness cycle phenomenon in most countries in the sample. Instead, it is the
consequence of an exceptional shift in their growth path. As for any other
ﬁlter, one can doubt if the HP ﬁlter is producing the ‘true’ pattern, e.g. if it
captures the level shift during the crisis years correctly. Yet, even regarding
14Both yt = log(Yt), xt, ct, st, and ǫt refer to log transformations of the orininal vari-
ables.
15The ﬁlter was proposed by HP (1980). λ is speciﬁed according to Ravn and Uhlig
(2002).
12it only as a means to take the high frequency ﬂuctuations is helpful, since
the smoothed series provide an intuitive summary of fundamental similarities
































































































Figure 2: Trend components of IPM obtained from decomposition
It is striking how similarly the growth components develop until mid-
1928. Deviating from this, the decomposition indicates that IPM in the
US stagnated already since 1925. The common shift in the growth path is
ﬁrst observed in the US and Germany. The Depression deeply but narrow
dented the growth trend of German IPM. In contrast, its impact on the US
economy seems smoother. The graph shows the comparably small impact
of the Depression on the growth path in Britain, Finland, Hungary, and
Sweden.
I have categorized each country according to the progression of its HP
growth component. One dimension of the grouping is the extent to which an
economy was aﬀected by the Depression. The other dimension is how quickly
its economy recovered from the slump. Grouping the countries along these
dimensions yields table 2. Next to Japan, France is not listed in this table.
The country’s growth trend is too diﬀerent, ﬁrst because its progression is
13Table 2: Extent of slump vs. speed of recovery











lagging that of all other countries. Second, if one holds the Great Depression
responsible for the prolonged decline after 1933, the long run eﬀect of the
crisis on the French economy was apparently much larger than for any other
country.
Persistence of the crisis seems to an important diﬀerencing criterion be-
tween countries. In fact, ﬁgure 2 makes it look improbable that the Depres-
sion was over in 1933. Table 2 adds the speed of recovery as a second dimen-
sion to the simple comparison of pre-Depression peak levels with the levels
at the lower turning points . Certainly, the distinctive feature of the crisis
was its diﬀerent extent across countries, but there were important diﬀerences
in the speed of the recovery as well. Only these diﬀerences explain why Ger-
many overtook its pre-Depression level of IPM already in 1935. By contrast,
Poland succeeded in doing so ﬁrst in 1938 (acc. to Landau and Tomaszewski
1986). It is perhaps no coincidence that all four countries, which were af-
fected heavily and recovered only slowly, are economically small and directly
neighboring Germany.16 At the same time, there is no country in any other
group, which is a adjacent to Germany.
Having obtained ˆ xt, one can subtract ˆ xt from yt in order to compute the
residual component, which consists of ct+ǫt+(xt−ˆ xt).17 Although the latter
relation cannot further be decomposed, it can still serve as an approximation
of the cyclical component ct. This residual component is also often dubbed
business cycle component.
The residual component suggests almost two complete cycles during the
period 1925-1936. This gives a reasonable average duration of above 6 years
16Interestingly, these countries seem not to beneﬁt in particular from the strong recovery
in Germany since 1932.



















































































Figure 3: Cyclical component of IPM for important economies
for one entire business cycle. The graph displays large cross-country diﬀer-
ences between 1925 and 1929. From late 1929 onward IPM in important
economies appears to progress comparably synchronized. Although the vari-
ation in cyclical ﬂuctuations in IPM remains high in this period, a hypotheti-
cal, unweighted mean would provide a good approximation to each country’s
cyclical component. [CORRELATION]
These ﬁndings also suggest the existence of an international business cycle
at the time and its potential interrelation with the Depression. In contrast
to the diﬀerences detected in the secular trend components, short-term ﬂuc-
tuations in the Central European countries do not appear to systematically
deviate from those in the rest of Europe and the US. Again, the French cycle
shows a characteristic lag, whereas the cyclical component for Japanese IPM
indicates comparably low correlation with the other countries especially after
1930. At least for the period 1925 to 1929, ﬁgure 3 is not clearly supportive
of Ritschl’s (2002) claim that the varying reparation and transfer schemes
during the 1920s induced speciﬁc German business cycles (Sonderkonjunk-
turen).
15From the perspective of trend-cycle decomposition the Great Depression
was not only a business cycle phenomenon. A major reason for its severe-
ness was a contemporaneous shift in most countries’ growth trend. The
decomposition provides a measure of this fundamental development, but it
is somewhat artiﬁcial. It only allows an arbitrary dating, because it is not
possible to jointly evaluate the trend and the cycle.
3.3 Results from Markov regime switching analysis
Empirical evidence suggests that many macroeconomic variables behave dif-
ferently during upswings and downturns, i.e. the underlying data generating
process (DGP) is subject to non-linearities (Hamilton 1989). One potential
reason is that utilization of factors of production in an economy changes with
diﬀerent states of growth of that economy, e.g. during booms and recessions.
The state is only one of many factors aﬀecting output dynamics. Trans-
lated to business cycles, this implies that even during a boom, one might
temporarily observe declining output.18
Hamilton (1989) proposed the following autoregressive (AR) process of
order one or n, subsequently denoted as AR(n), for the analysis of such
ﬂuctuations in a series yt, which in our case is the IPM index at time t.
(3) yt = cst + φyt−1 + ǫt
, where c is a constant, which takes diﬀerent values depending on the state
of the economy st at t and ǫt ∼ N(0,σ2). c changes when the economy is
shifting from one state s = 1 into another state s = 2. During one state cs
remains time-invariant. The states themselves are not observable.
Markov regime switching (MS) models are based on such AR processes
with variable dynamics. The approach was very successfully used in ana-
lyzing IPM in the post-WWII period (cf. Krolzig 1997, Hamilton 2005).
It appears particularly well suited for the interwar period, too. One can
certainly expect a major shift in factor utilization during an event as dis-
ruptive as the Great Depression. The MS approach allows for time series
analysis, where AR parameters are time-varying and can thus account for
non-linearities in the DGP. Furthermore, it produces stylized facts that are
straightforward to compare and has therefore become increasingly popular
for characterizing ﬂuctuations in aggregate economic activity (see e.g. AKT
2004).
18As an illustration cf. the diﬀerenced series in appendix A.
16As a simple speciﬁcation, we assume the existence of two states of the
economy. Let the economy be driven by two regimes. Thus, the DGP is
driven by two regimes, regime 1 and 2, which lead to recessions and booms,
repectively. Let regime 1 prevail from time t = 1 up until t = t0, i.e. in
period t0 occurs a regime shift in the stochastic DGP. The process under
regime 1 with st = 1 yields
(4) yt = c1 + φyt−1 + ǫt
for t = 2,...,t0. As the model is applied to the ﬁrst diﬀerence of the IPM
index, the coeﬃcients c1 and c2 represent the mean growth rate during state
1 and state 2, i.e. during recessions and booms, respectively. The comple-
mentary model with st = 2 for t = t0 + 1,t0 + 2,...,t0 + T gives
(5) yt = c2 + φyt−1 + ǫt
Note that st itself is a random variable. When estimating the model,
one infers on the probability that one regime, which leads to the respective
state, prevails conditional on the available set of information about the likely
state in the previous period. The simplest such speciﬁcation is that st is the
realization of a two-state Markov chain with
Pr(st = j | st−1 = i,st−2 = k,...,yt−1,yt−2,...)
= Pr(st = j | st−1 = i) = pij
(6)
As stressed by Krolzig (1997) model selection within the MS framework
is not always very straightforward. Since the estimation relies on numerical
and iterative procedures, there is the risk of obtaining local maxima. Krolzig
(1997, chapter 7) recommends as a solution that the researcher should have
some prior view on potential regime shifts. I obtain such prior information by
applying a general-to-speciﬁc modelling strategy similar to Krolzig (1997).
On the one hand, the results from the MS approach should not entirely
contradict the pseudo-NBER dating. On the other hand, regime probabilities
obtained from the simple two-state model applied to each country provide
prior knowledge about potential DGPs. This model is an MSM(2)-AR(7),
i.e. a MS-AR with switches in the mean (M) and an AR process of order
seven. It is a slight modiﬁcation of the original Hamilton MS-AR.19 The ﬁt
19Hamilton applied a MSM(2)-AR(4) to quarterly US GDP. However, models with
higher AR-order than 7, like the analogous MSM(2)-AR(12), were too computationally
demanding to be performed here. Estimation of MS models in this section was performed
via the MSVAR package v1.31k in Ox v3.40.
17of this model as well as the resulting AR-coeﬃcients serve as a starting point
for more complex models.
The estimation was performed using monthly percent diﬀerences instead
of log diﬀerences. Against the background of the Great Depression the latter
cannot be regarded as a good approximation of the former.20
The two-state model yields meaningful regime switches only for the course
of IPM in Finland, Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Sweden, and Japan.
In similar studies of the postwar period, parsimonious two-state models per-
formed mostly very well (cf. Hamilton 1989, Krolzig 1997). The results for
these countries plus the US are presented in table 3.21 The regimes identi-
ﬁed for the aforementioned countries are largely consistent with the pseudo-
NBER dating. Take the case of Germany, for which the model provides
evidence of a recession in mid 1925 as well as of a double-dip recession be-
tween spring 1929 and fall 1932. Considering the switching means  1 and  2,
the analysis of German IPM yields coeﬃcients of  1 = −2.29 and  2 = 1.41.
The recessionary regime 1 is comparably persistent according to the high
probability of remaining in regime 1 conditional on being in regime 1, given
by p11 = 0.895. From this ﬁgure one can directly compute the expected
duration of recessions in interwar Germany as (1 − p11)−1 yielding nearly 10
months.
The coeﬃcient  1 implies an annualized growth rate of German IPM
during recessions of –24.3%, which is computed as ((1+0.0229)12−1)∗100%.
The corresponding annualized growth rate during booms is 18.3%. These
growth rates relate to the following periods, where the probability of the
German economy being in recession is above 50%: From September 1925
(1925:9) until January 1926 (1926:1), from 1928:9 until 1928:11, from 1929:7
until 1931:1, and from 1931:8 until 1932:7.22
Appendix B contains the corresponding plots of regime probabilities for
every country in the sample (cf. ﬁgures 24-35 as well as table 5). Together
with table 5, these ﬁgures reveal large country-speciﬁc diﬀerences. Aus-
tria’s and Czechoslovakia’s IPM are subject to frequent regime shifts even
20The results presented in this section stem from the estimation of the ﬁrst diﬀerences
of each series computed as percent change on the month earlier. Using the augmented
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, the presence of a unit root could not be rejected at the 5%
signiﬁcance level for any series. Having taken ﬁrst diﬀerences, the null of a unit root was
rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level in each case indicating stationarity .
21Table 5 in appendix B gives the results for every country in the sample.
22This dating is similar to the one yielded by the pseudo-NBER approach, namely from
the second quarter 1925 (1925–2) to the ﬁrst quarter 1926 (1926–1) as well as from 1927–3
to 1927–4, 1928–2 to 1928–4, 1929–3 to 1931–1, and from 1931–3 to 1932–3.
18Table 3: Regime coeﬃcients obtained from an MSM(2)-AR(7)
Coeﬃcient Germany Austria Japan Finland US Sweden CZ
Regime-dependent means
 1 -2.29 -1.82 -0.74 -0.86 -0.02 -3.71 -0.78
 2 1.41 1.99 1.19 0.82 1.15 0.73 2.21
AR coeﬃcients
α1 0.233 -0.694 -0.464 -0.414 0.660 -0.501 0.431
α2 -0.015 -0.427 -0.390 -0.147 -0.183 -0.284 0.197
α3 0.039 -0.456 -0.183 -0.163 0.033 -0.061 -0.213
α4 0.110 -0.493 0.077 -0.192 -0.139 -0.006 0.364
α5 -0.138 -0.261 0.230 -0.097 -0.029 0.152 0.211
α6 0.106 -0.265 0.433 -0.146 -0.103 0.134 -0.158
α7 0.097 -0.072 0.268 -0.062 0.207 -0.007 -0.148
Persistence of recessions: transition probabilities and expected durations in month
p11 0.895 0.795 0.703 0.945 0.984 0.635 0.871
duration 10 5 3 18 62 3 8
Variances and actual number of months in recession between 1925 and 1936
σ2 5.02 8.27 1.76 10.85 4.71 8.70 1.21
# month rec. 40 66 41 30 131 12 94
# obs. 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
lnL 308.84 253.13 362.39 266.13 312.65 270.83 372.38
LM rejected yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: “LM rejected” refers to the rejection of the H0 of a linear model using the
Davies test. “# month rec.” gives the number of months for which the probability of
recession is above 50%.
19after 1933. Either of these two countries experienced strong growth during
expansions. In Austria recessions were rather short and strong, whereas in
Czechoslovakia they were modest but long lasting. For Czechoslovakia, which
comprised the most industrialized part of the former Austro-Hungarian em-
pire, I ﬁnd a high probability of recession during almost 70% of the sample
period. Finland and Sweden experienced the least number of months in re-
cession. The Swedish economy had few very short and strong contractions,
in Finland there were only one modest, but continued recession in Finland.
Japan, by contrast to any other country, was subject to frequent regime shifts
only until 1931. In comparison, its recessions were not only short but also
moderate with an annualized rate of –8.5%. The MS approach presents dif-
ferences between these economies during the crisis in comprehensive manner.
The graphs indicate clearly that the initial two-state model does not ﬁt
very well the development of IPM in several countries during the interwar
period. In these cases it is not possible to unambigously distinct periods of
growth from periods of decline. In some cases the model indicates that one
regime prevails all the time. In other cases the probability of one regime
is not clearly higher than for the other regime.23 The partial failure of the
model might indicate that the economic development during the interwar
period requires less parsimonious MS models.
At the same time also Krolzig (1997) and AKT (2004) have shown that
allowing for more than two states improves the performance of MS models in
explaining the economic development of certain countries. The MS model’s
applicability depends on amplitudes and exceptional states of growth in the
time series analyzed, e.g. very high growth rates in Japan during the 1970s.
Such features are the likely reason for the above results as well. Take the
graphs from the pseudo NBER approach (cf. appendix A). The IPM series
of some countries, for which the model failed to produce sensible estimates,
are indeed having exceptional amplitudes. Within a short period of time, the
amplitude is larger than 30% in the US (1933) and Sweden (1925) and larger
than 60% in Belgium (1935) and Britain (1926). If economic ﬂuctuations are
in general not persistent enough, the MSM struggles as well in identifying
regimes. This is the case for French, Polish, and Hungarian IPM.
One way to extend the simple speciﬁcation (3) is to allow for state-
dependent heterogeneity as well as for state-dependency of AR coeﬃcients.
In addition, it is possible to relax the restriction on the number of states, i.e.
23The former is the case for the US, Poland, France, and Sweden, the latter is the case
for the UK, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Belgium.
20to allow for three or more regimes.
(7) yt = cst + φstyt−1 + ǫt
, where ǫt ∼ N(0,σ2
st). It is possible to test, whether a model with fewer
restrictions like equation (7) is superior to a more parsimonious one like
equation (3). Model choice is diﬃcult, but it can be crucial for results.
Building on the MSM(2) results, the aim is to identify a suitable MS-
model for each economy in the sample. Since I want to allow for more complex
set-ups, I am using MS models with shifts in the intercept (MSI).24 MSI are
not as computationally demanding as MSM and better suited for the analysis
of less restrictive and thus less parsimonious models. In order to mark the
diﬀerence between the estimation outputs, I am using a diﬀerent notation for
the respective state parameters, namely ν in case of MSI. Krolzig (1997) has
shown that for dating purposes, both approaches lead to comparable results
for simple speciﬁcations with two regimes. Based on the initial MSM(2)-
AR(7) model and the rejection of the linear model, I adopt a three step
strategy.25
1. If the smoothed regime plots of MSM(2) and MSI(2) indicate that a
two-state model is not appropriate for a certain country, relax restri-
cions on the number of regimes stepwise up to n = 4.
2. Once the estimation output indicates that the number of states suf-
ﬁces to capture the fundamental development of IPM, I use diagnostic
statistics of the residuals to check, whether restrictions ought to be en-
tended or relaxed on (a) the numner of AR terms, (b) state-dependency
of heterogeneity or the variance, respectively, as well as on (c) state-
dependency of the AR-terms.
3. Using the likelihood ratio (LR) test, I decide whether additional restric-
tions are necessary or dispensable.26 Finally, the most parsimonious
24In general, MSI models allow for smooth regime shift, whereas MSM models assume
regime shifts within one period. For a conceptional description and a detailed comparison
of the MSM and MSI approach, cf. Krolzig (1997, section 11).
25The LR test on the number of states does not have a standard asymptotic distribution.
Thus, it is in general not possible to test H0:  1 =  2 vs. H1:  1  =  2 or H0: ν1 = ν2 vs.
H1: ν1  = ν2, respectively (Krolzig 1997, p.247). However, a general test on the linearity of
the model can be performed using the Davies test, which belongs to the class of likelihood
ratio tests as well. It compares a model with n = 1 regimes, i.e. a linear model, to more
complex model. The null is given by H0: n = 1 vs. H1: n ≥ 2 regimes. Cf. Davies (1987).
26The LR test can be based on the LR statistic LR = 2(lnL(˜ λ) − lnL(˜ λ0)), where (˜ λ0)
denotes the restricted ML estimate of the parameter vector λ. Under the null, LR has an
asymptotic χ2 distribution with r degrees of freedom. r gives the number of restrictions.
21model possible is chosen.
The following results are based on the resulting MSI(n)-AR(p). Models
investigated subsequently dispose of diﬀerent numbers of states n and diﬀer-
ent AR orders p. Furthermore, the error variances may be state-dependent
σst. Concerning the estimation, it is unsatisfying that for some countries the
results are sensitive to the model speciﬁcation, e.g. state-dependency of AR
coeﬃcients. Therefore, I apply further test statistics, namely the Akaike as
well as the Bayesian Information Criterion, (AIC) and (BIC), respectively.
If necessary, results from alternative speciﬁcations are mentioned.
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Figure 4: US IPM: MS model with 3 states, MSI(3)-AR(7)
Subsequently, the case of the United States, i.e. the economically most
important country, exempliﬁes the empirical strategy. The outcome of the
MSM(2) and similarly of the MSI(2) suggest that interwar IPM might be
modelled more approriately allowing for more than two states. Figure 4
presents a MSI(3)-AR(7). The graph is a nice illustration of how the model
works. In the upper row the ﬁtted model, i.e. the estimated intercept, is
plotted against month-to-month diﬀerences in IPM, given in percent (dotted
vs. bold line). Shifts in the intercept are in fact recognizable. The plots in the
second to fourth row indicate the corresponding conditional probabilities for
each regime over time. I consider mainly the smoothed regime probabilities,
from which I infer on the state of the economy. They determine the mean
growth rates, which are one estimation output among others provided in the
ﬁrst column of table 4. Note that although most of the variation in the time
22series is explained by regime 1 and regime 2, the model ﬁt is much improved
when allowing for the third regime. The third regime leads to what Krolzig
(1997, p. 240) denotes as an “outlier state”. However, the model is still
unable to account for the strong contractions during the ﬁrst half of 1932, in
1933, and in the second half of 1934.
In order to account for two potential outlier states a MSI(4)-AR(7) is
used, which can deal with periods of both extreme contraction and extreme
expansion. The results are given in the second column of table 4. Indeed, the
model identiﬁes two regimes of moderate growth and decline, ν3 and ν2, as
well as two regimes states that entail extreme positive and negative growth,
ν4 and ν1, respectively. The residuals’ plot points to the presence of both
heterogeneity and autocorrelation. The LR test is used in order to evaluate,
whether to prefer a MSIH(4), i.e. a MSI accounting for state-dependent
heterogeneity, over a more parsimonious MSI(4). I computed the test statistic
as LR = 2(lnL(˜ λ) − lnL(˜ λ0)) = 2[(−282.42) − (−294.89)] = 24.94. At the
1% signiﬁcance level, the critical value is given by χ2
0.99(4) = 13.28. The
rejection of the null-hypothesis means that the LR test suggests the adoption
of a MSIH.27 Both the AIC and the BIC indicate to use the MSIH, too. After
testing this model against other speciﬁcations, I decided to stick with the
MSIH(4)-AR(7).28
The estimation output of the MSIH is given in column 3 of table 4. In
addition, column ‘United States’ of table 6 (p.52) provides the corresponding
regime switching probabilities. The approach identiﬁes two moderate growth
regimes and two regimes with extraordinary growth similar to the MSI(4).
The means of the moderate regimes (ν2, ν3) imply annualized growth rates
of about –8.1% during recessions and 9.8% during upturns. The annualized
growth rates implied by ν1 and ν4 are much higher. These coeﬃcients are still
reasonable though, since industrial production is often much more volatile
than GDP. Note that the low value of p22, which is the probability of remain-
ing in regime 2 conditional on being in regime 2, reﬂects the low persistence
of this state. The estimation yields that most of the AR coeﬃcients are neg-
27These tests implicitly require the regime-preserving hypothesis ν1  = ν2  = ν3  = ν4.
The number of degrees of freedom is given by the diﬀerence in restrictions. It is equal to
four, because in the case of MSI(4) homogeneity is assumed in four states.
28The MSIH was tested against the following speciﬁcations: MSIH(4)-AR(6), MSIH(4)-
AR(8), and MSIH allowing for state-dependent AR terms MSIAH(4)-AR(7). MSIH(4)-
AR(6) was rejected by LR, AIC, and BIC. The algorithm of the program was inable to
obtain numerically stable estimates for the MSIH(4)-AR(8). On the MSIAH(4)-AR(7) the
resulting test statistics are contradictory: The LR test rejects the null of state-independent
AR coeﬃcients at the 5% level, whereas AIC and BIC yield lower values for the MSIH
than for the MSIAH.
23Table 4: Estimation of diﬀerent MSI(n)-AR(p) for US IPM
Coeﬃcient MSI(3)-AR(7) MSI(4)-AR(7) MSIH(4)-AR(7)
Regime-dependent intercepts
ν1 -2.498 -3.529 -2.704
ν2 0.790 -0.160 -0.697
ν3 11.472 1.989 0.786
ν4 11.532 4.911
Regime-independent AR coeﬃcients
α1 0.275 0.258 0.228
α2 -0.151 -0.209 -0.134
α3 -0.109 -0.105 -0.112
α4 -0.177 -0.210 -0.072
α5 -0.053 -0.130 -0.110
α6 -0.136 -0.177 -0.179
α7 0.045 0.017 0.181
Persistence of regimes: transition probabilities
p11 0.875 0.829 0.907
p22 0.954 0.890 0.502
p33 0.577 0.865 0.965
p44 0.596 0.506










Number of months in recession, 1925–1936
# rec. month 42 31+55 34+14
# obs. 136 136 136
lnL -302.34 -294.89 -282.42
LM rejected yes yes yes
Notes: “LM rejected” refers to the rejection of the H0 of a linear
model using the Davies test. I added together the number of
months in recession, which are due to diﬀerent regimes.
24ative, which accounts for the ﬂuctuations of the series around the conditional
intercepts. Note that allowing for state-dependent heteroskedasticity reveals
huge diﬀerences in error variances between the states (cf. the diﬀerent σ in
column 4). Table 4 also shows that relaxing the model w.r.t. heterogeneity
leads to substantial changes in the estimates of the intercepts.
Apparently, regime 2 must be regarded as a transitory state during the
interwar period. Two ﬁndings add to this suggestion: First, the correspond-
ing switching probabilities p21, p23, and p24 are comparably high (cf. table 6).
Second, ﬁgure 5 depicts that the US economy was driven by regime 2 primar-
ily when switching from the exceptionally bad regime 1 back into growth.29
This is the case in early 1931 and late 1932. In mid 1933, a period of very
strong growth is impeded by moderate decline. This interruption is interest-
ing as it highlights the point in time, when recovery of the US economy fell
behind other economies.
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Figure 5: MSIH(4)-AR(7) yields outlier and transitory states for the US
Considering ﬁgure 5, the inferred growth rates are reasonable. Up un-
til September 1929, the MSI(4) model yields unambigous evidence that the
moderate rate growth regime prevailed. According to the smoothed series,
the conditional probability of being in regime 1 is persistently above 0.5 since
October 1929.30 This dating is in accordance with the one provided by the
29The growth rate amounted to –28.0% p.a. during regime 1.
30Note that the smoothed probability takes into account the information of the entire
data set, the ﬁltered (unsmoothed) series indicates the state probability of the economy
25NBER. The Great Crash at Wall Street occurred at the end of the same
month. It is unlikely, however, that the crash had a retrospective eﬀect on
industrial production. The MS model is further evidence that Black Thurs-
day was a consequence of the perceived downturn in the real-economy rather
than causal to its decline.
The model dates the end of the ﬁrst stage of the Depression to January
1931 and its second stage to the period May 1931 to June 1932. This dating
is independent from using a model with four or three states. Only from
March 1935 on, the US economy was persistently more likely to be in an
expansionary state than in recession. The conditional means ν1 and ν3 are
in accordance with the presumption that the downturn was harsh, whereas
growth, even after the 1932, was rather modest. These ﬁndings contradict
the NBER’s dating, which ﬁnds the end to the Great Depression in the US
already in 1933.
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Figure 6: Japan experiences only a single-dip recession, MSI(2)-AR(3)
Figure 6 shows the estimated regimes for the Japanese interwar economy.
There are several notable diﬀerences to the development in the US, the most
important of which is the existence of stable regimes in a regular two-state
pattern. Like many other countries, Japan was subject to a recession in
1926. This ﬁnding suggests a global dimension of this early contraction, even
at time t based only on the information available at time t (for details see Artis, Krolzig,
and Toro 2004).
26though evidence for the US is mixed.31 The estimation yields that Japan was
much shorter aﬀected by the world economic crisis than any other country.
The economy jumpstarted in January 1931. This month marks the early end
of the recession in Japan. Thereafter, Japan experienced prolonged growth
- a striking contrast to the frequent regime shifts governing the development
of US IPM between 1931 and 1935.
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Figure 7: MSIH(4)-AR(3) displays two outlier states for German economy
After the US, it is certainly Germany’s economic development in the
interwar period that has attracted the most intensive research. This was
probably due not only to the exceptional economic decline, but also to the
political aftermath of the Great Depression. The empirical strategy suggests
the adoption either of a MSIAH(4)-AR(7) or a MSIH(4)-AR(3).32 Again,
I am adopting the more parsimonious MSIH(4)-AR(3). Independent from
the model chosen, the ﬁltered and smoothed regime probabilities indicate
that negative innovations recurrently depressed the German economy already
between 1925 and 1928. One recession, beginning in May 1927, is found for
Germany but for no other country. The date coincides with the crash at
the Berlin stock market. There are further shocks in spring 1928 as well as
particularly adverse shocks in September 1928. The overall picture of the
German economy appears gloomy long before the Depression ﬁnally began.
31In case of the US, I obtain evidence of a recession between 1925 and 1929 only from
the pseudo-NBER approach, but not from the MS-AR estimation.
32Whereas the LR test and AIC prefer the MSIAH, the BIC suggests the use of the
MSIH since it penalizes the use of additional parameters more strongly.
27The MSIH dates beginning of the Great Depression in Germany to May
1929, which is very early. It indicates the ﬁrst stage of the depression in
Germany three month in advance of Japan and almost half a year ahead
of the US. The model suggests a high probability of recovery already since
February 1931, which causes a pronounced double-dip pattern in case of
Germany. In June 1931 gold reserves of the Reichsbank plunged to the
statutory minimum. During three month, from August 1931 to October 1931,
the German economy is in deep recession according to the high probability
of outlier state 1. The corresponding regime implies a conditional mean of
ν1 = −6.843, which gives an annualized growth rate of –57.3%. In contrast
to the ﬁrst stage of the Great Depression, this major shock occurs with a
lag of several months on the development in the US. In November 1931 the
economy switches back into the normal recessionary regime 2, for which a
conditional intercept of ν2 = −1.307 is estimated. From September 1932
onwards, the German economy is constantly in one of the two expansionary
regimes. The coeﬃcients related to recessions, ν2, as well as the coeﬃcients
of the conditional intercept during expansions, ν3 = 1.081 and ν4 = 2.961,
are reasonable estimates. They imply annualized growth rates of –14.6%,
13.8%, and 41.9% during contractions or expansions, respectively. The last
ﬁgure seems unrealistic at ﬁrst, but it represents the boost to expansion in
September 1932 and at the turn 1933/1934. Thus, regime 4 characterizes the
striking performance of the German economy after the aforementioned long-
lasting recession. Additionally, the latter of these upturns coincides with
strong recovery in the US.
The impact of the British miners’ strike in 1926 complicates the analysis
of interwar IPM in the UK. The 42% decline in IPM in May 1926 and the
subsequent recovery with an increase in the index of 20%-odd per month in
December 1926 and January 1927 dominate the identiﬁcation of regimes. The
estimation strategy suggests the adoption of a MSIH(4)-AR(7), which does
not deliver reasonable regimes, however. This model dates the beginning
of the contractionary regime in Britain to March 1927 and its end to July
1932. An alternative model is the MSIAH(4)-AR(3) that is depicted in ﬁgure
8. The latter model ﬁnds a high probability for the recessionary regimes 2
and 4 between 1927 and as 1932 as well. Yet, it identiﬁes three separate
contractions during the same period. Neither of the two models is able to
fully capture the outlier states. The MSIH does not yield sensible conditional
intercepts for the recessionary state. The test statistics remain inconclusive
on which model to prefer. Thus, I computed a MSI model leaving out the ex-
ceptional year of 1926.33 The model yields three separate recessions between
33If the sample period is restricted to 1927-1936, a simple MSI(2)-AR(7) suﬃces to
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Figure 8: UK miner’s strike requires 4-state model, MSIAH(4)-AR(3)
1927 and 1932. The dating of recessions is very similar to the one provided
by the MSIAH(4)-AR(7) for the period 1925-1936 (cf. ﬁgure 45). Therefore,
I am adopting the latter speciﬁcation, even though it is less parsimonious
than the MSIH.
The beginning of the depression’s ﬁrst part is dated to August 1929 and
its end to April 1931, i.e. several month behind Germany and in advance of
the US. British IPM recovered substantially between June 1931 and February
1932, i.e. with a 4-5-month lag on Germany and Japan. The second stage of
the Depression is evident between February 1932 and July 1932, which is a
lot later than in the US and Germany. The conditional intercept of regime
2 ν2 is equal to –0.907 implying annual growth of –10.4% during recessions,
whereas ν3 = 1.09 yields an annualized growth rate of about 13.9%. In
comparison to most other countries, the decline in Britain was moderate and
the second ‘dip’ lasted less long. The UK was more superﬁcially aﬀected by
the Great Depression than other countries.
These results make it diﬃcult to reason that Britain’s exit from the gold
standard in September 1931 was a prerequisite for an eventual recovery as
claimed by Eichengreen (2004).34 First, economic recovery likely began sev-
describe the development of IPM.
34Additionally to leaving gold, however, it “was also necessary also (sic!) to abandon the
ethos of the gold standard that encouraged the continued pursuit of restrictive policies”
and thereby prevented the resumption of rapid growth (Eichengreen 1992, p.289).
29eral months before Britain’s exit from the gold standard. Second, when
Britain had ﬁnally left gold, this step could not prevent the economy from
sliding back into recession in February 1932. Third, the recession in Britain
between 1929 and 1931 was far from being as as deep as in the US, Germany,
or Poland - although these countries adhered to the gold standard as well.
As Britain’s ﬁnancial position was weak as well it is certainly not the reason
for any diﬀerence in the severity of the decline (cf. Eichengreen 1992).
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Figure 9: Frequent regime shifts in French economy acc. to MSIH(4)-AR(7)
After the dissolution of the interwar gold standard, several countries, led
by France, decided to remain on gold. Among these countries were Poland,
Belgium, and Czechoslovakia. Adherence to this Gold Bloc is often blaimed
as the main reason, why these countries suﬀered particularly badly during the
Great Depression. This analysis conﬁrms this suggestion at least concerning
the duration of the recession. As apparent from the initial MSM(2), a two-
state model is not appropriate for the French interwar economy. It is neither
in the case of Belgium and Poland. However, even the four-state model seems
too restrictive to distinguish between certain periods of more modest and
more rapid growth or decline, respectively. Still, the MS-approach reveals
important diﬀerences in their respective economic development. Diﬀerent
from all other countries IPM in France showed very little variation and was
still declining as of March 1935. During the 1920s, the economy lagged the
development in all other economies by at least half a year. Interestingly,
the French economy recovered strongly since August 1932, which coincided
with the development in Germany and Britain rather than with the course of
30IPM in its fellow Gold Bloc member states. If one interprets the beginning
of regime 1 as a sign of the second stage of the depression in France, then
the economic deterioration coincided with the overall double-dip pattern as
well.
The selected MSIH(4)-AR(7) indicates a high probability of being in
one of the diﬀerent recessionary states between May 1930 and July 1932.35
Eichengreen (1992, p.255) states that “[t]hrough the end of 1930 [...] France
remained a prosperous island in a sea of depression.” Obviously, this island
was ﬂooded somewhat earlier. Recovery in France is interrupted very early
by another recession taking place between August 1933 and March 1935.
The French economy experiences relatively mild recessions, for which the
conditional mean is ν2 = −0.781. Growth during expansion is very sluggish
with a conditional mean of merely ν3 = 0.379. Whereas most other coun-
tries experience continued expansion of IPM until 1936, we even ﬁnd another
contraction, the beginning of which is dated to June 1936, i.e. two month
after the general strike in France took place. The end of this contraction is
dated to September 1936, i.e. one month after France’s decision to dissolve
its commitment to gold.
A much stronger contraction took place in Belgium at about the same
time.36 This coincidence could suggest periodic transmission of shocks be-
tween the French and the Belgian economy. Yet, considering the course of
IPM in Belgium over the whole interwar period, the cycle appears to follow
more closely the pattern found for Britain and the US (cf. ﬁgure 41). Instead
of the expected co-movement with France, the MSIH(3)-AR(5) gives a high
probability for the Belgian economy being in recessions already from October
1929 to May 1930 and again between September 1931 and June 1932. Similar
to other countries, industrial production in Belgium displays a double-dip.
In addition, the Belgian economy is subject to two major drops in IPM on
a month-to-month basis, namely in April 1932 and between March and May
1936. The recessions identiﬁed take place during the Great Depression and
are quite short, but very deep. Growth regime 3 seems to represent a reaction
to a preceding exceptional fall in IPM.
The results from MS models for the Central European countries diﬀer
somewhat from the results for the Western economies discussed before. The
Republic of Poland provides the prime example of the Central European
malaise during the interwar period. Unlike Germany, there is no evidence of
35The AIC favors a model with state-dependent AR terms, i.e. a MSIAH, which is
however is rejected by the LR test and the BIC.
36I was not able to ﬁnd any reference to this event in the literature.
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Figure 10: MSIH(3)-AR(1) ﬁnds Poland subject to longest lasting recession
an outlier contractionary state. Instead, the selected MSIH(3)-AR(1) spec-
iﬁcation yields a high probability of being in recession for almost the entire
period between 1928 and 1932. With the exception of a few months at the
turn of the year 1929, the Polish economy was in recession for about 50
consecutive month (cf. ﬁgure 10). What is more, the coeﬃcient for the re-
cessionary regime ν1 = −1.858 is one of the lowest across the entire sample.
It implies an annualized growth rate rate of the Polish economy of –20.2% on
average during this period. Although Poland remained on gold after 1931,
the economy developed more similarly to the German or British cycle than
to the French business cycle. One might speculate if the Polish business cycle
was mainly driven by Germany’s economy. Both the dating of pre-Depression
ﬂuctuations and the prolonged boom after 1932 are quite similar. Yet, post-
Depression growth in Poland of 11.6%, given by ν2 = 0.916, is less dynamic
than in Germany at that time.
The course of IPM in the Republic of Austria can be modelled by a
MSI(2)-AR(7). Apart from an early and short contraction in 1926, the model
yields only few regime shifts. The beginning of the Depression in Austria
is dated to September 1929 (cf. ﬁgure 42). Measured by the smoothed
probabilities of the MS model, Austria’s economy uninterruptedly declined
between 1929 and 1933. Only the ﬁltered probabilities suggest the beginning
of that upturn in 1931, which actually took place in other countries at about
the same time. The absence of the double-dip pattern in Austria might be
due to the failure of Creditanstalt that occured in May 1931. Creditanstalt’s
32failure is regarded a major blow to the Central European banking system as
a whole (see e.g. Wandschneider 2005).
The Czechoslovakian business cycle developed similarly to Poland and
Austria, i.e. the Austria-Hungary’s further sucessor states. Being the suc-
cessor state that comprised the most industrialized part of the empire, it
suﬀered from long-lasting decline of IPM over the whole period. Diﬀerent
from its neighbors, including Germany, the recessions identiﬁed are less dev-
astating with an annualized growth rate of –9.5% at least until 1931. In
addition, contractions since 1931 appear to be due to a shifts into a regime
of much stronger decline, i.e. regime 1. The economy is subject to fre-
quent regime shifts both before 1929 and still long after 1933 (cf. ﬁgure 39).
Contrary to the development in Austria and Poland, the MSIH(4)-AR(9)
provides evidence that Czechoslovakia took part in the worldwide upturn in
the midst of the Great Depression as well.
As far as the remaining countries are concerned, we ﬁnd the following.
The world economic crisis aﬀects the Swedish economy merely by stagnation.
The MS approach yields a two-state model. It gives that the country was
only superﬁcially aﬀected by the Great Depression, even less strongly than
Japan though for a longer period of time. In case of Hungary and Finland,
the EM algorithm did not converge when ﬁtting the likelihood. Thus, it was
not possible to obtain an appropriate MS model for these countries.
334 Inferences on the global crisis
Until now I have analyzed business cycles in the interwar period country by
country. This section aims at putting together previous results in order to
make inferences on the global depression. Choosing a descriptive approach, I
transformed each IPM series into a binary time series, where 1 indicates that
a recessionary regime prevails and 0 indicates that an expansionary regime
prevails.37 Figure 11 gives the number of countries in recession in a particular
month, i.e. the sum over the binary time series. The graph summarizes the
scope of the Great Depression and is based on the results from the individual
MS-AR estimation.38 The ﬁgure is an impressive image of the extraordinary
nature of the downturn at global level.


































Figure 11: Countries in recession acc. to MS-AR dating
Making a distinction between an international and a regional cycle is nat-
urally subject to choice. Thus, I chose 50% as threshold level that separates
the former from the latter. Under this assumption, the early decline in 1925
37For countries with more than two regimes I make a dichotomous distinction between
expansion and contraction based on a smoothed regime probabilities greater than 0.5. If,
at a certain point in time, the country was likely in recession – or in an outlier recession
state – the respective time series observation is set to 1, otherwise it is set to 0.
38Finland and Hungary were excluded from this overview. The total number of countries
is thus ten.
34indicates the beginning of an international business cycle. In late 1925 40%–
60% of the countries in the sample are found to be in recession. Between 1926
and mid-1929 this share provides evidence of a global boom as it is always
ranging from 10% to 30% and even decreases to 0% in December 1928. The
share of countries in recession rises sharply from 20% in April 1929, to 50%
in August and reaches 90% in October 1929.
In comparison to the ﬁrst downturn in 1925, the following decline has
a diﬀerent scale. At the peak of the series 100% of the countries in the
sample are in recession. Taking into account the months, during which at
least 90% of all countries in the sample are in recession, we end up with a
period of more than one and a half year of uninterrupted downturn between
September 1929 and January 1931. The international cycle displayed the
double-dip pattern that was visible in many of the single-country analysis
as well. It was caused by the temporary upturn in 1931, during which the
share of countries in recession fell to 50% in June 1931. As for being such
a regular pattern observed in many countries’ business cycle, the temporary
upturn has attracted little attention in the literature or has perhaps been
overlooked. Considering annual data, but without an explicit geographical
focus, Eichengreen (1992, pp.258-259) expects that in 1931
“[after] two years of decline, the market’s self-equilibrating ten-
dencies should have asserted themselves. [...] Far from improving,
however, the situation deteriorated markedly in the second half
of 1931.”
Following the short-lived recovery, there is another year during which again
80% to 90% of the countries are in recession. Recovery of the global economy
is underway since August 1932, when the critical share falls below 50%.
The improvement is, however, weak and instable in many countries. This
development is contrary to what one observes after recessions in the post-
WWII period. Impeded recovery is one main reason for the poor economic
performance of the Western world during the interwar period.
Some countries departed from the general pattern. Although there are
signs of recovery in 1931 in Austria and Sweden as well, the likelihood for
being in recession overweighs. The French economy did not recover in 1931
at all. Instead, it slided further into recession. Interestingly, the beginning
of it’s outlier recession state is dated precisely at the same time, when most
other countries begin to decline again after the temporary recovery. Yet,
there is no immediate link between adherence to the Gold Standard and
country-diﬀerences in the course of IPM. [[depict correlation between number
35of months in/ depth of recession and number of months adhering to GS after
1930.]] The double-dip in IPM, which occurs in the US, Germany, and the
UK, but also in Belgium. In only two countries there is no sign of a double
dip at all, namely in Japan, where recovery remained uninterrupted since
1931 and in Poland, where the economy remains in the same contractionary
state all the time.
The entire period could roughly be divided into three phases. All coun-
tries in the sample, except for Sweden, were in recession around the turn of
the year 1926. Evidence of a recession in the US at that time is mixed. Since
1926 the global economy expanded until fall 1929 and contracted until mid
1932. Independent of the approach used, I ﬁnd that all of the countries got
into recession between early 1929 (e.g. Germany) and late 1929 (e.g. the
US). A special case is France, which was in recession probably ﬁrst in early
1930. With a huge variation in time, IPM began to pick up in most countries
in 1932. Although a global expansion seems underway after the summer of
1932, several countries, including the US, recovered ﬁrst in 1933 and some
did even later. The economic downturn in several countries at the end of
1936 indicates an early end to this second business cycle.
From the binary time series I computed Pearson’s contingency coeﬃcient
(PCC) as a simple, non-parametric measure of business cycle co-movement.
The extent of regime co-movement refers to months in recession coinciding for
a pair of countries.39 The resulting correlations are similar to the ﬁndings of
AKT (2004) for European countries between 1970 and 2001. If a contingency
coeﬃcient of 0.5 is a threshold level for high contemporaneous correlation,
business cycles in Europe display a high degree of co-movement. Yet, also the
course of business cycles in Japan and in the US was highly correlated with
that of many European economies. Recessions in the US coincide with those
in every European economy, except with the ones in Germany and Britain.
The highest correlations across the entire sample are found between Sweden
on the one hand and Austria as well as Poland on the other hand.
The lowest correlations are found between the French and other Euro-
pean economies. They remain strikingly low with regard to other Gold Bloc
members, even when the sample is split at the turn 1929 to 1930. Splitting
the sample suggest, moreover, that the Great Depression had an integrating
eﬀect, since co-movement was generally higher after 1930 than beforehand.40
There is a certain probability of an international cycle, since the correla-
tions indicate co-movement between the output series. Starting in 1926, one
39The PCC is computed according to the formula in AKT 2004, i.e. it is corrected to
be in the range of 0–100 and can be read in percentage terms.
40Since the resulting sub-samples are fairly short, I do not interpret the ﬁgures in detail.
36and a half international business cycles were completed until 1937. However,
a test of the hypothesis that the Great Depression represented a common
cycle in Europe, or internationally, requires a more objective measure than
a threshold level of correlation. Compared to the results in AKT (2004),
the commonality of business cycles in European countries during the inter-
war period was lower for France and higher for Britain than it was in the
post-WWII period.
From the analysis, one can infer on additional stylized facts:
(a) Average growth rates –negative and positive– are large compared
to the post-WWII period. In addition, there is evidence of exceptionally
adverse, i.e. outlier, recessionary regimes in several economies during the
Great Depression. Something similar has not been detected for any economy
after WWII.41
(b) The analysis gives that all countries in the sample, except Sweden,
were in recession between 1925 and the beginning of the Great Depression.
Evidence for the US is mixed.
(c) A second negative shock in the 1920s is observed in Germany, Poland,
Czechoslovakia, and to a lesser extent as well in Sweden. It is seemingly
absorbed, though, since all the former three countries return to expansion
after a few months.
(d) A worldwide upturn took place in the midst of the Great Depression
in 1931, in which only few countries did not take part, e.g. France. The
duration of this recovery, though, diﬀered greatly across countries. Recovery
in the US was extremly brief, whereas IPM in the UK was in expansion for
almost one year until March 1932. As the only country in the sample, Japan
managed to escape the second stage completely.
(e) Germany and the UK experienced persistent growth since summer
1932. Continued recovery began much later in all other countries. We observe
two diﬀerent groups of countries. In one group, e.g. in the US, the depression
ended relatively early, but recovery was interrupted frequently afterwards.
The other group, e.g. Czechoslovakia and France, experiences a continued
decline, i.e. the absence of fundamental recovery.
(f) It appears that countries in Central Eastern Europe were aﬀected
particularly negatively. In comparison to most other countries in the sample,
the economic downturn in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Austria was larger,
prevailed longer, and recovery was sluggish.
41This conclusion refers to the studies of Hamilton (1989, 2005), Krolzig (1997), and
AKT (2004).
375 Conclusions
This study views the troubled interwar period, and in particular the Great
Depression, through the lens of business cycle analysis. It aims at delivering
the ﬁrst consistent dating of cyclical macroeconomic ﬂuctuations for a large
set of countries. A second aim was to derive some stylized facts on interna-
tional similarities and systematic diﬀerences in the course of the crisis, e.g.
speciﬁc to certain groups of countries. The data set comprises 10 European
countries, the US, and Japan.
The analysis yields the following results. All of the three empirical ap-
proaches applied indicate that an unusually strong economic downturn, i.e.
Great Depression, occured at the turn of the decade. In contrast to similar
research on the postwar period, there is evidence of a particularly adverse
economic state, expressed either by a change in long-term growth or as a
extraordinary growth state. This ﬁnding is expressed by the fact that it
the preferred MS model of aggregate industrial activity in several countries
allows for four growth states.42 Comparing these ﬁnding to post-WWII stud-
ies, which analyze business cycles at international level and rely on a similar
methodology, emphasizes the distinctive nature of the Great Depression by
its severity, duration, and geographical scope.
The adverse impact of the crisis on an economy did not coincide with
its degree of industrialization. Highly industrialized countries belong both
to the group of worst and least aﬀected countries, cf. the US and the UK.
Considering the case of Poland and France or Japan, the same is true for
less industrialized countries as well. It seems, though, that Central Europe
- with the exception of Hungary - suﬀered more than Western Europe and
Skandinavia during the Great Depression, and perhaps even more than the
US. This ﬁnding is due to the high persistence of recessions in Central Europe,
which was probably due to their weak economies through the entire 1920s
(e.g. Landau and Tomaszewski 1986).
In how far is it possible to regard the Great Depression as an extraor-
dinary downturn in the global business cycle? As of 1930, IPM declined in
every country in the sample, regardless of belonging to the core of industrial
activity or to its periphery. At the peak of the recession, ten out of ten coun-
tries considered are found to be in recession. In the mid-1920s already, the
coincidence of recessions around the world implies economic co-movement
42Two four state models are due to strikes before the Great Depression (in the UK) and
thereafter (in France). This is certainly a drawback from using sensitive IP data without
smoothing them ﬁrst.
38not only within Europe but also between Europe, the US, and Japan. In
order to measure commonality of business cycles I computed PCC for each
country pair. The results yield a high degree of co-movement between most
countries during the sample period, i.e. from 1925 to 1936. High correlations
are found not only among European economies but also between certain Eu-
ropean economies on the one and and Japan as well as the US on the other
hand.
A further result is that impeded growth after 1932 was an international
phenomenon, which was not limited to one or two countries. Inspite of
being an important determinant of the lost decade the economic diﬃculties
in many countries after 1932 are usually not considered as part of the Great
Depression. Particularly, the sharp decline in French IPM since August 1933
and in the US and Czechoslovakian after May 1934 deserves further attention.
Neither result can be easily explained with the international monetary
framework. An immediate link between adherence to the Gold Standard
and the charactistics of the depression is not visible from the cross-country
analysis. There are substantial diﬀerences in the course of the recession even
between the Gold Bloc members, notably France, Poland, Belgium, and, until
1934, Czechoslovakia. It remains sketchy how much the monetary tightening
in the US could have contributed the recessions in the ROW and if there
existed a link between going oﬀ gold and escaping the crisis. High correlation
of business cycles is nither very consistent with Eichengreen’s hypotheis as
well, since it requires a high co-movement of business cycle, except for the
US and perhaps for France.
Taken together, the study underlines that the Great Depression was ex-
traordinary not only in its impact on single countries, but on the global
economy as a whole. Further research can integrate the results of this study
into the investigation of the global transmission of real and monetary shocks.
The analysis also emphasizes the necessity of a more technical analysis of co-
movement in order to extract the common business cycle component in the
world economic crisis. Thus, the results point to the potential outcome of
a MS-Vector Autoregression, which could estimate a common regime-shifts
representing the international business cycle during the interwar period.
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6.1 Data sources
All IP data used in this paper were taken from XXX.
In order to obtain samples of the same length and frequency for each
country, I had to manipulate data in case of four countries, namely the UK,
Japan, Hungary, and Finland. Taking percent diﬀerences, I investigated
41series of country-speciﬁc physical production in certain industries for their
correlation with IPM. I selected one or several series, for which I computed
the highest correlation. Thereafter, I used this information to interpolate or
extrapolate, respectively, the missing data.
UK: Data on IPM is only available at quarterly frequency. The contem-
poraneous correlation between IPM and a composite series of coal, steel, and
iron production between 1925 and 1936 was calculated to be 0.83, with only
minor correlations a lag before and after. The composite series consists of
indexed and equally weighted series for each product and was averaged over
quarters. The variation in the monthly production series was then used to
interpolate a monthly IPM series.
Japan: Data on IPM is not available for 1925. The contemporaneous
correlation between IPM and coal production between 1925 and 1936 was
calculated to be 0.63, with no signiﬁcant correlations before and after. The
monthly production series was then used to estimate monthly IPM in 1925
via linear regression.
Hungary: Data on IPM is not available for 1925 and 1926. The con-
temporaneous correlation in quartely ﬁgures between IPM and a composite
series of brown coal and iron ore production as well as railway shipments
was calculated to be only 0.42. First the composite series for 1925 and 1926
was used to estimate quarterly IPM during this period via linear regression.
The variation in the monthly production series was then used interpolate a
monthly IPM series.
Finland: Data on IPM is not available for 1925 and 1926. As data on
relevant production is neither available for this period, I had to resort to
the physical amount of shipments by Finish railways. The contemporaneous
correlation in quartely ﬁgures between IPM and shipments was calculated
to be only 0.41, making it still the most closely correlated series during the
period 1927-1934. First the composite series for 1925 and 1926 was used to
estimate quarterly IPM during this period via linear regression. The variation
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5B Regime probabilities from MSM(2)-AR(7)
model (Kalman ﬁltered and smoothed)
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46Figure 30: Czechoslovakia
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47Table 5: Regimes obtained from an MSM(2)-AR(7)
Coeﬃcient Germany Austria Japan Finland US Sweden CZ Belgium Poland Hungary France Britain
Regime-dependent means
 1 -2.29 -1.82 -0.74 -0.86 -0.02 -3.71 -0.78 -0.23 0.04 0.02 -3.53 0.30
 2 1.41 1.99 1.19 0.82 1.15 0.73 2.21 0.97 7.70 0.61 0.16 0.41
Regime-independent AR coeﬃcients
α1 0.233 -0.694 -0.464 -0.414 0.660 -0.501 0.431 -0.248 0.208 0.015 0.575 0.106
α2 -0.015 -0.427 -0.390 -0.147 -0.183 -0.284 0.197 -0.114 -0.096 -0.070 0.177 0.026
α3 0.039 -0.456 -0.183 -0.163 0.033 -0.061 -0.213 -0.094 0.454 -0.031 0.208 0.056
α4 0.110 -0.493 0.077 -0.192 -0.139 -0.006 0.364 -0.039 -0.002 -0.026 -0.004 0.091
α5 -0.138 -0.261 0.230 -0.097 -0.029 0.152 0.211 0.049 0.045 0.124 -0.017 0.107
α6 0.106 -0.265 0.433 -0.146 -0.103 0.134 -0.158 - -0.087 0.048 -0.048 0.022
α7 0.097 -0.072 0.268 -0.062 0.207 -0.007 -0.148 - 0.035 -0.075 -0.082 -0.310
Persistence of regimes: transitions probabilities and expected duration of recessions
p11 0.895 0.795 0.703 0.945 0.984 0.635 0.871 0.778 0.968 0.724 0.492 0.759
duration 10 5 3 18 62 3 8 5 31 4 2 4
p22 0.959 0.810 0.876 0.986 0.598 0.965 0.715 0.734 0.000 0.760 0.968 0.744
σ2 5.02 8.27 1.76 10.85 4.71 8.70 1.21 35.06 4.53 9.00 0.59 23.23
# obs. 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136 136
lnL 308.84 253.13 362.39 266.13 312.65 270.83 372.38 193.21 313.72 282.95 445.82 219.41
LM rejected yes yes yes yes yes yes yes no yes no yes no


















































Figure 36: United States
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Figure 45: Britain, 1927-1936
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1Table 6: (a) Regimes obtained from individual MSI(n)-AR(p)
Coeﬃcient Germany Austria Japan Finland Unites States Sweden
MSIH(4)-AR(3) MSI(2)-AR(7) MSI(2)-AR(3) MSIAH(2)-AR(3) MSIH(4)-AR(7) MSIH(2)-AR(5)
Intercepts and AR coeﬃcients depending on regime 1




Intercepts and AR coeﬃcients depending on regime 2















α1 0.031 -0.424 -0.188 0.228 -0.195
α2 0.014 -0.104 -0.202 -0.134 -0.220
α3 -0.006 -0.156 -0.147 -0.112 0.077
α4 -0.202 -0.072 -0.050
α5 -0.030 -0.110 0.093
α6 -0.177 -0.179
α7 -0.045 0.181
Transition probabilities and expected duration of recessions in months
p11 0.461 0.909 0.930 0.959 0.908 0.972
duration 2 11 14 24 11 36
p12 0.025 0.047 0.019 0.472 0.075 0.018
p13 0.039 0.028
p14 0.000 0.000
p21 0.218 0.091 0.070 0.041 0.000 0.028












Variances, dependent and independent of regime
σ2 11.62 2.76
σ2
1 4.17 8.68 2.28 12.50
σ2





# obs. 140 136 140 140 136 138
lnL -312.34 -375.94 -277.21 -358.56 -282.42 -343.23
Recessions 1925:5-1926:4(2) 1925:9-1925:10 1925:5-1926:10 1925:5-1928:3 1925:9-1925:9(2) 1928:4-1932:9
identiﬁed 1927:6-1928:1(2) 1926:3-1926:9 1929:8-1931:2 1928:5-1931:11 1929:10-1931:1(1)
1928:3-1928:5(2) 1929:9-1933:1 1932:6-1933:12 1931:3-1931:5(2)







Notes: “LM rejected” refers to the rejection of the H0 of a linear model using the likelihood ratio test.
52Table 7: (b) Regimes obtained from individual MSI(n)-AR(p)
Coeﬃcient Czechoslovakia Belgium Poland Hungary France Britain
MSIH(4)-AR(9) MSIH(3)-AR(5) MSIH(3)-AR(1) MSIH(4)-AR(6) MSIAH(4)-AR(3)
Intercepts and AR coeﬃcients depending on regime 1




Intercepts and AR coeﬃcients depending on regime 2




Intercepts and AR coeﬃcients depending on regime 3




Intercepts and AR coeﬃcients depending on regime 4





α1 0.098 0.055 -0.155 0.148
α2 0.115 0.017 0.118
α3 -0.035 0.008 0.123
α4 0.207 -0.002 -0.128






p11 0.818 0.754 0.940 0.846 0.236
duration 5 4 17 6 1
p12 0.000 0.063 0.001 0.000 0.000
p13 0.072 0.010 0.185 0.000 0.012
p14 0.182 0.015 0.340
p21 0.000 0.016 0.000 0.040 0.000
p22 0.843 0.936 0.960 0.931 0.908
duraction 6 14 11
p23 0.114 0.382 0.173 0.029 0.028
p24 0.211 0.002 0.281
p31 0.000 0.231 0.060 0.035 0.383
p32 0.157 0.002 0.039 0.059 0.092
p33 0.814 0.607 0.642 0.868 0.904
p34 0.187 0.038 0.379
p41 0.182 0.000 0.381
p42 0.000 0.000 0.000
p43 0.000 0.173 0.055
p44 0.419 0.827 0.000
Regime-dependent variances
σ2
1 1.90 1.74 5.71 1.98 0.00
σ2
2 0.43 4.66 2.13 0.49 4.75
σ2
3 0.70 295.84 3.24 0.57 3.42
σ2
4 2.16 0.29 0.44
# obs. 134 138 142 136 140
lnL -235.48 -357.13 -322.97 -161.44 -304.79
Recessions 1925:11-1926:7(2) 1925:12-1926:1 1925:3-1926:1 1926:10-1926:10(2) 1925:8-1925:8(4)
identiﬁed 1927:9-1927:11(1) 1929:10-1930:5 1928:4-1928:10 1926:11-1927:4(1) 1926:1-1926:1(4)
1928:2-1928:6(2) 1931:4-1931:4 1929:1-1933:3 1930:5-1931:9(2) 1926:3-1926:3(4)
1928:8-1928:10(2) 1931:9-1932:6 1931:10-1932:7(1) 1927:1-1927:1(4)








Notes: “LM rejected” refers to the rejection of the H0 of a linear model using the likelihood ratio test.
53Table 8: Contemporaneous cross-correlation of high probability of being in recession
Country pair Germany Austria Japan Unites States Sweden Czechoslovakia Belgium Poland France Britain
Contingency coeﬃcients for the entire period 1925:7-1936:12
Germany 100.0
Austria 47.6 100.0
Japan 50.9 60.6 100.0
United States 41.2 70.9 22.2 100.0
Sweden 69.7 80.2 40.9 72.3 100.0
Czechoslovakia 47.3 40.7 38.6 50.9 44.9 100.0
Belgium 54.3 56.1 24.0 54.6 61.8 49.1 100.0
Poland 68.4 68.6 42.8 58.3 81.2 38.7 49.2 100.0
France 6.0 18.9 16.3 58.3 35.5 7.2 14.5 10.7 100.0
Britain 63.6 45.3 44.3 33.8 56.3 23.0 33.4 35.2 18.7 100.0
Contingency coeﬃcients for the period 1925:7-1929:12
Germany 100.0
Austria 9.1 100.0
Japan 11.9 81.6 100.0
United.States 37.2 63.5 47.3 100.0
Sweden 44.5 29.5 21.4 57.3 100.0
Czechoslovakia 30.7 29.9 36.3 19.8 34.1 100.0
Belgium 41.6 36.7 52.6 76.4 49.2 43.0 100.0
Poland 44.9 3.2 20.1 39.8 59.5 30.7 44.5 100.0
France 41.1 36.7 38.4 18.9 29.5 60.9 21.3 59.0 100.0
Britain 31.8 6.6 20.9 25.8 2.4 5.3 33.2 41.3 36.1 100.0
Contingency coeﬃcients for the period 1930:1-1936:12
Germany 100.0
Austria 82.6 100.0
Japan 72.7 61.2 100.0
United.States 70.2 70.9 47.0 100.0
Sweden 90.5 92.5 68.7 73.0 100.0
Czechoslovakia 63.2 44.3 48.9 62.9 48.5 100.0
Belgium 69.2 59.8 19.6 44.6 63.0 51.1 100.0
Poland 82.6 94.9 61.2 75.2 92.5 44.3 53.6 100.0
France 36.8 24.2 26.4 55.7 44.0 36.7 13.1 17.4 100.0
Britain 80.0 77.9 83.3 59.6 85.8 45.9 41.4 77.9 30.6 100.0
Notes: Pearson’s contingency coeﬃcient given in percentage terms and normalized to the interval 0 to 100 (cf. AKT(2004) App.2).
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